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Abstract
This paper shows novel evidence on the mechanism through which nancial constraints amplify uctuations in
asset prices and credit demand. It does so using contractual features of housing nance. Among agents whose
housing demand is constrained by the availability of collateral, those who can borrow against a larger fraction
of their housing value (achieve a higher loan-to-value, or LTV, ratio) have more procyclical debt capacity.
This procyclicality underlies the nancial accelerator mechanism described by Stein (1995) and Bernanke et
al. (1996). Our study uses international variation in maximum LTV ratios over three decades to test whether
(a) housing prices and (b) demand for new mortgage borrowings are more sensitive to income shocks in coun-
tries where households can achieve higher LTV ratios. The results we obtain are consistent with the dynamics
of a collateral-based nancial accelerator in housing markets.
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1 Introduction
Theoretical research proposes that endogenous developments in the nancial markets can greatly
amplify the e¤ects of small income shocks through the economy (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; and
Bernanke et al., 1996, 1999). Bernanke et al. (1996) call this amplication mechanism the nancial
acceleratoror credit multiplier.The key idea behind the nancial accelerator is the notion that
shocks to the net worth of rms and households have a procyclical e¤ect on their borrowing capacity.
This can happen either because the information cost wedge between external and internal nance
moves countercyclically (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989), or because a procyclical change in the value
of collateralizable assets changes the external nancing capacity in the same direction (Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997). Following a positive income shock, agents should be able to raise more external -
nance and the increase in borrowing capacity would further boost spending. According to this view,
the endogenous procyclicality of the external nancing capacity of rms and individuals may help
explain important features of the business cycle and the transmission of monetary policy.
There is very little evidence on the amplication mechanism that underlies the nancial acceler-
ator. Remarkably, the empirical work on the accelerator has avoided the essential task of isolating
features of real-world nancial contracts that can bring about the hypothesized multiplier e¤ects.
Instead, most studies look at rm data to explore one insight behind the accelerator story: income
shocks should a¤ect corporate spending when rms have imperfect (or constrained) access to credit.
Empirically, the investment spending of nancially constrained rms should be more sensitive to
changes in net worth than the investment of unconstrained rms (see Hubbard, 1998). Another
working hypothesis is that constrained rms spending and borrowing should uctuate relatively
more in the aftermath of monetary and other macro shocks (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). Unfor-
tunately, while comparisons between constrained and unconstrained rms might show whether one
groups investment is more dependent on income and net worth, they may not identify whether
di¤erences in spending stem from an endogenous nancial mechanism. Because constrained rms
are more dependent on internal funds for investment, they should be more sensitive to a shock that
a¤ects income and net worth even when the shock has no endogenous, pro-cyclical e¤ect on their
borrowing capacity. Recent research has further argued that the di¤erential investmentincome sen-
sitivity of rms that are often seen as constrained typically small and young  can be explained
by models that ascribe no role to nancial constraints (e.g., Gomes, 2001; and Alti, 2003).
How can one identify whether there is an independent spending e¤ect coming from an endogenous
change in nancing capacity following an income or wealth shock? The theory suggests that the e¤ect
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of an income shock on constrained agentsspending should be greater when debt capacity is pro-
cyclical. In this vein, economists have tried to quantifythe overall magnitude of the amplication
e¤ect for rms with (presumably) procyclical net worth.1 But crucially, this empirical strategy does
not revolve around any particular type of nancial contracting. An alternative approach is to gauge
the degree of procyclicality in agentsnancing capacity and then pin down the dynamics of the
nancial accelerator by looking at cross-sectional di¤erences in the spending responses to economic
shocks of strictly constrained, cyclical agents. This entails the examination of a real-world contract
used by nancially constrained agents. We pursue such an approach in this paper.
The housing market is an ideal laboratory for conducting a test of the accelerator. The cru-
cial feature of housing nance contracts that we explore is that the availability of mortgage credit to
households is typically limited to a specic proportion of the value of the house they own or are about
to purchase (the maximum loan-to-value, or LTV, ratio). We use the theoretical framework developed
by Stein (1995) to understand how the presence of a maximum LTV ratio (which implies a down pay-
ment constraint) a¤ects prices in the housing market. Stein shows that a binding down payment con-
straint can increase the housing-price impact of a shock that changes the fundamentals of the housing
market  such as an income shock that changes housing demand  relative to a benchmark case in
which such constraints are absent. The excess sensitivity of housing prices is generated by a nancial
accelerator mechanism: the initial shock changes household wealth through changes in housing prices,
this in turn shifts household debt capacity, amplifying the impact of the initial shock on demand and
prices, and so forth. These feedback e¤ects eventually die out, but they can have long-lasting e¤ects.
It is easy to illustrate our main working hypothesis using the constrained housing market equilib-
rium characterized by Stein (1995). Suppose that constrained households receive a positive income
shock that boosts housing prices. Clearly, the higher the LTV ratio that households can achieve
(i.e., the lower the down payment requirement), the higher the associated increase in their borrowing
capacity that is generated by the ensuing increase in prices. The procyclical increase in borrowing
capacity should itself allow households to further increase housing spending, amplifying the collateral-
based spending cycle. If an accelerator e¤ect is present, then housing prices should respond more to
the initial income shock when the maximum LTV is high. In this fashion, the relation between LTV
ratios and the income sensitivity of housing prices provides for a direct test of the endogenous mecha-
nism underlying the nancial accelerator: the impact of shocks to household income on housing prices
is amplied by the higher marginal opportunity to borrow associated with a high loan-to-value ratio.
1This is the spirit of the simulations in Bernanke et al. (1999); see also Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
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Testing this hypothesis requires some degree of exogenous variation in borrowing constraints (i.e.,
in LTV ratios). Fortunately, data from international housing markets can be used to test the ac-
celerator theory. To give a concrete example of what we have in mind, consider a country in which
housing nance is not well-developed, such as Italy, where historical maximum LTV ratios do not
exceed 60%. On the other hand, take a country such as the UK, where LTV ratios averaged 90%
in the last two decades. The accelerator argument suggests that so long as the collateral constraint
is binding in both countries, the housing credit multiplier would be much stronger in the UK than
in Italy.2 Simply put, the collateral-based accelerator story that we examine predicts that, because
households in high LTV countries have more procyclical debt capacity, housing prices should be more
sensitive to income shocks in the UK than in Italy. We are able to pursue a testing strategy of this
sort using a unique set of data on international housing that we have assembled. To our knowledge,
this is the most extensive data bank of this type.
The accelerator mechanism of Stein (1995) has a second testable implication. The theory predicts
that the housing demand shocks are amplied through changes in the demand for mortgage debt.
To wit, if the e¤ect of LTV ratios on housing price dynamics is generated by a credit multiplier,
then new mortgage borrowings should also be more sensitive to housing demand shocks in countries
with higher maximum LTV ratios. International data on mortgage borrowings allow us to test this
second hypothesis.
Finally, our study further characterizes the nancial accelerator by developing a third testable
hypothesis. This hypothesis arises from the existence of an additional borrowing constraint in mort-
gage markets: the income (or a¤ordability) constraint. The income constraint stems from real-world
features of mortgage contracts that limit the yearly amount of housing expenditures associated with
the loan (mortgage payments plus taxes and insurance) to a certain fraction of the households yearly
income. For our purposes, the key di¤erence between the collateral and the income constraints is
that only the former type of constraint gives rise to a credit multiplier. To wit, if the income con-
straint binds, then a households marginal opportunity to borrow depends positively on its future
income stream. On the other hand, the marginal ability to borrow under income constraints does
not increase with the current value of the housing unit. The upshot of integrating both types of
constraints on household spending in a nancial accelerator model is the observation that whenever
the income constraint binds, the positive relation between maximum LTV ratios and the sensitivity
2Note that one could argue that collateral constraints might become less important in the UK, because high
maximum LTV ratios (low down payment requirements) allow a greater fraction of the households to become
unconstrained. We incorporate this possibility in our empirical tests (see Section 4.4).
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of housing prices to income should vanish. In other words, recognizing this additional constraint
provides for yet another layer of contrasts that we can use to identify the accelerator.
Disentangling the e¤ects of the income and collateral constraints in housing markets is not a
trivial task.3 Our empirical strategy explores well-known characteristics of international housing
markets to identify situations in which the income constraint is more likely to bind. In particular,
we conjecture that the income constraint is more likely to bind when the price of a typical housing
unit is high vis-à-vis the household disposable income (high price-to-income ratio). Cross-country
di¤erences in price-to-income ratios  engendered, for example, by demographic and geographic
factors  introduce exogenous variation in housing a¤ordability.4 We expect that if the relation
between price sensitivities and the LTV ratio are driven by the collateral constraint, then it should
be especially strong in countries with more a¤ordable housing.
The evidence of this paper provides support the nancial accelerator theory. First, our tests show
that housing prices are indeed more sensitive to income shocks in countries with higher maximum
LTV ratios. Our estimates indicate that in countries like the UK, where the LTV ratio is around
90%, housing prices decrease by more than 1.2% in the rst year following a 1% decrease in per capita
GDP. On the other hand, in countries such as Italy, where the LTV ratio is around 60%, housing
prices decrease by only 0.8% following a 1% decrease in per capita GDP. Second, eshing out the
nancing mechanism underlying the accelerator, we nd evidence that new mortgages responses to
household income shocks are also increasing in maximum LTV ratios. Finally, and consistent with
our conjecture about the joint role of income and collateral constraints, we nd that the relation
between LTV ratios and income sensitivities is stronger in countries where housing is cheaper relative
to household disposable income.
Our analysis explicitly recognizes a number of alternative factors that could inuence the results
we report. For example, we control for variables that are likely to be correlated with maximum
LTV ratios and that could also explain the cross-country di¤erences in income sensitivities, such as
economic development and the propensity for homeownership. In particular, we nd that the housing
price e¤ect of the LTV ratio remains after expunging the component that is explained by economic
development and homeownership. We also explicitly consider the potential for simultaneity biases
in our tests and use an alternative approach in which LTV ratios are instrumented with proxies for
3Unfortunately, we are not aware of the existence of historical data on maximum ratios of mortgage payments to
household income for countries other than the US.
4E.g., in our data, Singapore is an expensive housing country, while the US is classied as having cheap housing.
The di¤erence in housing a¤ordability between these two countries is likely to be a function of their demographic and
geographic characteristics. Similar patterns can be seen across countries such as Switzerland and Japan on the one
hand, and Canada and Australia on the other.
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nancial development (e.g., proxies for the quality of the judicial system and of accounting standards).
Importantly, the panel structure of our data set allows us to control for time- and country-xed e¤ects.
Our paper is related to several di¤erent strands of literature. We have already explained the rela-
tion between our hypotheses and Steins (1995) model of housing price dynamics. Our analysis also
borrows from Lamont and Stein (1999), who examine the sensitivity of housing prices to household
income across US cities. Using data from the US, they nd that housing prices are more sensitive to
changes in city-level GDP in years when homeowners in a particular city have high debt (a proxy for
liquidity constraints). Our study, in contrast, uses international variation in maximum LTV ratios
and in price-to-income ratios to identify procyclicality in debt capacity. Importantly, the key housing
nance variable we use (the maximum LTV ratio) is conceptually di¤erent from households existing
leverage. The maximum LTV ratio represents the marginal opportunity to borrow as a function of the
value of housing, while households leverage is an endogenous variable determined by past borrowing
decisions and planned future spending.5 Finally, Lamont and Stein do not examine the sensitivity of
new mortgages to income shocks, and they do not incorporate an income constraint in their analysis.
The current paper also adds to the literature that examines the e¤ects of nancial development
and nancial market liberalization. Existing papers focus primarily on the e¤ects of nancial devel-
opment and liberalization on the corporate sector and on overall growth rates (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; and Bekaert et al., 2005).6 However, household
behavior and housing markets are also likely to be a¤ected by cross-country variations in nancial
development. Related evidence of such e¤ects are found in Jappelli and Pagano (1989, 1994), who
study the relation between nancial development and macroeconomic variables, such as savings and
the consumption. Though not studying the accelerator, these authors use maximum LTV ratios as a
measure of nancial constraints on households exactly as we do  higher LTV ratios are associated
with higher debt capacity and less nancial constraints on households. Our results indicate that
nancial development is a contributing factor to the real-side e¤ects of the nancial accelerator.
Specically, they help identify a mechanism through which nancial development and liberalization
seem to magnify uctuations in housing prices: when nancial development is associated with lower
borrowing constraints (higher LTV ratios) the nancial accelerator becomes stronger.
The role of nancial constraints in housing markets has been examined by a few theoretical
papers besides Stein (1995). Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2005), for example, consider the e¤ects of
5While highly levered households are probably more constrained than less levered households, it is hard to argue
that households in the UK are more nancially constrained than those in Italy.
6See Levine (1997) for a survey of the literature on nancial development.
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an interaction between household heterogeneity and a collateral-type constraint on housing price
uctuations. Their model features an amplication mechanism that relates to the one we seek to
empirically identify in this paper: an income shock gets amplied through its impact on the ability
of constrained (young) households to a¤ord down payments. Similarly to Stein, their model predicts
that housing prices should initially over-react to income shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our empirical hypotheses.
In Section 3, we provide a detailed description of the international housing markets data we use in
the study. In Section 4, we present our empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Roles of Collateral and Income Constraints on Housing Price
Fluctuations
We build on the theoretical framework of Stein (1995) to develop our hypotheses about the e¤ect
of collateral and income constraints on housing prices. Stein models the equilibrium of the housing
market under the assumption that a minimum down payment is required for the purchase of a new
home. Specically, if the value of a new home is equal to P , then a household must contribute at
least a fraction  of this value to buy the new home. The down payment constraint means that
although the household can raise mortgage debt against the value of its housing wealth, the value of
the mortgage loan that can be raised cannot be higher than a fraction  (= 1  ) of P .
The parameter  can be interpreted as the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. The higher the
, the easier it is for a household to borrow in order to nance spending. In the real-world, this
parameter depends on variables such as the costs of enforcing and disposing of collateral, regulations
about housing nance, and the amount of information creditors have about borrowers.7 The fact
that the  can be lower than 1 represents a credit quantity (collateral) constraint on households.8
Stein characterizes the e¤ects of the down payment constraint on the comparative statics of the
model and shows that a binding constraint amplies the e¤ects of shocks to housing demand on equi-
librium housing prices, relative to a benchmark case with no down payment constraints. This ampli-
cation e¤ect is created by a credit multiplier.A shock that increases housing prices, for example,
also increases householdsborrowing capacity, because the ability to raise mortgage debt is directly
linked to the value of housing through the maximum loan-to-value ratio. As the increase in borrowing
capacity shifts out the demand for housing, the impact of the initial shock is amplied, and housing
7See Japelli and Pagano (1994) for a detailed discussion. Spiegel (2001) endogenizes down payment requirements,
and argues that LTV ratios can be used to forecast future housing returns.
8There is ample evidence from micro data that down payment requirements constrain household behavior. Stein
(1995), Genesove and Mayer (1997), and Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2005) provide references and discussion.
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prices increase even more, boosting household wealth and borrowing capacity further, and so on.
One implication of the mechanism described by Stein is that the pricenancing amplication
e¤ect is increasing in the change in borrowing capacity that follows the initial shock. To see this,
consider an extreme case in which households need to pay for the home entirely with their own funds,
that is, a case in which the maximum LTV ratio is zero. In this case, despite the extreme nature of the
credit constraint, there is no multiplier e¤ect being transmitted from the change in housing prices into
changes in borrowing capacity  the latter is always equal to zero. The total change in housing prices
will then be limited to the e¤ect of the initial shock. In contrast, if the maximum LTV ratio is high, a
change in housing prices will have a large e¤ect on borrowing capacity, kickstarting the amplication
mechanism. This discussion summarizes to the rst implication that we seek to test in this paper:
Implication 1. If the collateral constraint is binding, then the sensitivity of housing prices to shocks
to housing demand should be increasing in the maximum LTV ratio available to households.
Besides testing this central implication, our analysis aims at providing evidence for the specic
mechanism that explains the link between LTV ratios and housing price uctuations. According to
the theory, when the household is collateral-constrained, the e¤ect of a demand shock is amplied by
the associated change in borrowing capacity, and this amplication e¤ect is larger the higher is the
maximum LTV ratio. If this argument is correct, then new collateral-based borrowings by households
should also be more sensitive to demand shocks in countries with high LTV ratios:
Implication 2. If the collateral constraint is binding, then the sensitivity of new mortgage bor-
rowings to shocks to housing demand should be increasing in the maximum LTV ratio available to
households.
The amplifying e¤ect of a higher loan-to-value ratio is conditional on the down payment constraint
continuing to bind for the higher LTV ratios. If the maximum LTV ratio becomes so high that the
household can easily a¤ord the minimum down payment on the house, then we e¤ectively revert to
the benchmark case of no constraints in Steins model. In this benchmark case, the e¤ect of the
shock is again limited to the e¤ect of the change in fundamentals, given that borrowing capacity is
inconsequential for housing demand. Our empirical analysis explicitly addresses the possibility that
households might be largely unconstrained in high maximum LTV countries.
In addition, it is possible that the collateral constraint is not binding even in situations in which
the maximum loan-to-value ratio is relatively low. This possibility arises from the fact that in
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real-world mortgage contracts households face an additional constraint that limits the amount of
debt that they can raise against the house: the income, or a¤ordability constraint. The a¤ordability
constraint essentially limits the yearly amount of expenditures associated with the mortgage contract
(loan payments plus property taxes and insurance) to a certain fraction of the households expected
future yearly income. In the US, this fraction is around 28%.
The presence of income constraints means that households might be nancially constrained even
if they havent reached the maximum loan-to-value ratio. A simple example can illustrate this
possibility. Suppose that the value of the desired housing unit is equal to 100, and the maximum
loan-to-value ratio is 70%. Suppose, in addition, that the households current wealth level is equal
to 30, so that it can a¤ord the required down payment. In order to qualify for the loan, however,
the households future labor income must be 10:28 times greater than the required level of housing
expenditures associated with the loan of 70 (assuming US income limits). If we assume that yearly
housing expenditures amount to 10% of the value of the mortgage, then expected future household
income must be higher than 25, or else the household will not qualify for the loan. In such a case,
the households demand for housing would be constrained, but not by the collateral constraint.9
Steins model does not explicitly treat the idea of an income constraint. However, it is easy to
gauge the implications of such a constraint in the context of the amplication mechanism described
above. Essentially, if the income constraint binds (instead of the collateral constraint), then the self-
reinforcing mechanism that links changes in housing prices to changes in borrowing capacity should
vanish. To wit, when the income constraint binds, the households marginal debt capacity will in-
crease with future income, but it will no longer increase with the value of the housing unit.10 Because
the collateral-based amplication e¤ect goes away, the link between maximum loan-to-value ratios
and housing price uctuations should disappear. This discussion summarizes the third implication
that we seek to test in the empirical analysis:
Implication 3. The e¤ect of the maximum LTV ratio on the sensitivity of housing prices to housing
demand shocks is driven by country-years in which the income constraint is less likely to bind.
We discuss the details of the tests of our three hypotheses shortly. First, however, we describe
the data that we use to test our predictions. This is done in the next section.
9For example, if expected future income is equal to 15, the household can only a¤ord a loan of 42, and thus the
maximum amount that the household can pay for the housing unit is 42 + 30 = 72.
10 In our example, if expected future income is equal to 15, then the maximum loan amount equals 42, irrespective
of the value of the housing unit.
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3 Data Description
We gather data suitable for our analysis from a total of 26 countries over the 1970-1999 period (see
Table 2 for the list of countries). The housing price data are summarized in Table 1 together with the
data on per capita GDP (the main driving variable in our empirical tests) and annual new mortgages
(which we use to assess the credit e¤ects of the accelerator). We use yearly changes in the logs of
GDP and housing prices, deating the data with consumer price index series taken from the IMFs
International Finance Statistics database. New mortgages are expressed as a fraction of nominal
GDP. The data on housing prices and new mortgages are hand-collected from a number of di¤erent
sources, while the GDP data are taken from the IMF nancial statistics. We list all of our data
sources and provide detailed information about the di¤erent indices used in the Appendix.11 Our
sample has 754 country-year observations.
  insert Table 1 here  
Table 2 displays country-level data on maximum LTV, homeownership, and housing price-
disposable income ratios. Each of these series is relevant for our analysis. The maximum LTV
ratio is the empirical counterpart of the parameter  described in Section 2. Most of the LTV data
are taken from Jappelli and Pagano (1989, 1994), who also use the maximum LTV ratio as a measure
of the availability of credit to households in international housing markets. Those authors argue that
the maximum LTV ratio is a direct measure of constraints on households that is comparable across
countries. We were able to augment the Jappelli and Pagano data set using data from Chiuri and
Jappelli (2000), and by looking into the sources cited therein. We collect additional data on LTV
ratios from a number of other sources as well (see the Appendix). Table 2 shows that maximum
LTV ratios vary signicantly around the world. Developing countries, such as Korea and Taiwan,
generally have lower LTV ratios (as low as 30%). However, there is variability even among developed
economies, as evidenced by the case of Italy, where the LTV ratio is 60% during the 1990s, and
the UK, where the LTV is 95% during that same period. Maximum LTV ratios seem to vary less
over time within a country, but a number of countries register signicant time variation in LTVs
(examples are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hong Kong, Sweden, Spain, and the UK). This allows
us to explore both within- and cross-country variations in the dynamics of the nancial accelerator.
  insert Table 2 here  
11The data used in this paper are available from the authors upon request.
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Our empirical analysis uses homeownership to control for di¤erences in the size of the rental
market. The homeownership ratio represents the proportion of home owners as a fraction of to-
tal households in a country. Country-level homeownership data were hand-collected from several
sources. Table 2 suggests that these country series remain relatively stable over time.
In Section 2, we argue that the e¤ect of the maximum LTV ratio on income sensitivities should
be signicant when the collateral constraint is binding. However, it is also possible that the income
constraint binds, which could dampen the positive association between LTVs and price-income sen-
sitivities. Identifying which of those constraints is most likely to bind in each of the countries we
study is not an easy task. Clearly, the income constraint is more likely to bind when the maximum
fraction of mortgage expenditures (loan service, taxes, and insurance) to expected household income
is low. But, unfortunately, we do not have mortgage contract data on income limits for countries
other than the US.
In order to implement a test of the income constraint we need a source of cross-country varia-
tion that is exogenous and that changes the likelihood that the income constraint will bind. In the
absence of data on mortgage-income limits, we conjecture that the income constraint will be more
likely to bind when the typical housing unit in the country is high (expensive) when compared
to the disposable income of a typical household. Specically, we employ the ratio of the price of a
typical dwelling unit to yearly median household disposable income (price-income ratio) to gauge
the likelihood that the income constraint binds in a given country. This proxy seems to suit our
needs well: if housing is expensive relative to householdsdisposable income, then mortgage expen-
ditures should be more likely to reach the households income constraint. Noteworthy, there is a
large cross-country variation in the ratio of the value of a typical housing unit to disposable income
(Table 2). In countries such as Switzerland and Singapore, typical housing units are substantially
more expensive than in other countries, such as the US and Canada. Importantly, these di¤erences
seem to be driven by factors such as country geography and size as well as population growth and
density, and thus are at least partially exogenous.
4 Empirical Tests
Our baseline tests focus on cross-country-year di¤erences in the sensitivity of housing prices to in-
come shocks. According to the nancial accelerator hypothesis, that sensitivity should be especially
strong when the maximum LTV ratio is high, because of the endogenous change in debt capacity
following a positive shock to income. In addition, new mortgage borrowings should also be more
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sensitive to income shocks if the maximum LTV ratio is high. Finally, the income constraint suggests
that the relation between LTV ratios and income sensitivities should be stronger in countries with
relatively cheap housing (i.e., low price-income ratios). Finding that these patterns are present in
the data is consistent with evidence of the nancial accelerator in housing markets.
4.1 Housing price dynamics
We need a benchmark empirical model of housing price dynamics to test our hypotheses. Following
Lamont and Stein (1999), we use the log change in the housing price index as the endogenous
regressor in our baseline model. Besides including current household income in our model, we look
at the literature for additional determinants of housing prices. For instance, there is ample evidence
of a consistent autoregressive pattern in housing prices. There is positive autocorrelation at short lags
(Poterba, 1991; and Lamont and Stein, 1999), but negative serial correlation at longer lags (Case and
Shiller, 1990; and Lamont and Stein, 1999). This pattern has been shown to hold in international data
as well (see Englund and Ioannides, 1997). We experiment with the use of these lag structures in turn.
In Table 3 we pool the sample in a panel regression and search for a model to t our data on
housing prices. Column (1) shows that real housing prices are indeed correlated with real current
income (proxied by real per capita GDP). Two additional lags of per capita GDP are also signicant
when no other variables are included in the regression, as shown in column (2). Columns (3) and (4)
show that there is positive price autocorrelation at short lags, but negative autocorrelation at longer
lags (long-term reversal). This is true both with and without the inclusion of country e¤ects.12
  insert Table 3 here  
Column (5) adds other macroeconomic variables to the model of column (3). Both the real in-
terest rate and the ination rate have negative e¤ects on housing prices, but their e¤ects are not
always signicant. Finally, in columns (6) and (7) we use the empirical model proposed by Lamont
and Stein (1999) in their study of housing price dynamics in US cities. Essentially, they replace
longer lags of price and income changes with the start-of-period ratio of price to per capita income
(Pricet 1=Incomet 1). As in Lamont and Stein, column (6) shows that longer lags of price and
income become insignicant once we include the lagged ratio of price to per capita income. The
more parsimonious specication of column (7) seems to capture well the e¤ects of the longer lags.
12Following the standard approach in the literature, most of our models are estimated via OLS and include both
lagged dependent variables and xed e¤ects (see, e.g., Lamont and Stein, 1999). We, however, recognize the potential
for biases in this procedure, and later emphasize results from the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator.
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In what follows, we introduce LTV ratios and income constraints in our analysis, using, alter-
natively, the specications in columns (1), (3), (4), (5), and (7) of Table 3. This approach might
seem tedious, but it will demonstrate that our ndings do not hinge on the selection of a particular
specication for housing price dynamics.
4.2 Collateral constraints and the income sensitivity of housing prices
We introduce collateral constraint e¤ects in our analysis by allowing the price-sensitivity of income
to vary according to the maximum LTV ratio (Implication 1). This amounts to augmenting our
empirical models by adding an intercept term for the LTV ratio and another term capturing the
interaction between LTV and per capita GDP growth. When we use multiple lags of GDP growth,
we interact the LTV ratio with all of those lags, besides the current GDP growth (lag 0). This
approach will capture the e¤ect of the accelerator even if it takes longer for it to feed through the
economy. We then test whether an increase in LTV increases price-income sensitivities by testing
whether the parameters on those interaction terms are signicantly greater than zero.
Table 4 presents one of the main set of results of our paper. Column (1) shows that the correlation
between changes in housing prices and changes in household income is indeed higher in countries
with higher maximum LTVs. The positive e¤ect of the LTV ratio remains after we include further
lags of price and income in the specication, as shown in column (2). The sum of the interaction
terms of the LTV with the current and past lags of the change in income is positive and signicant
at the 1% level. When we include country e¤ects in the model the sum of the interaction terms
increases (see column (3)). Column (4) shows that the inclusion of ination and interest rates in
the specication reduces the e¤ect of the LTV ratio, but the interaction e¤ects are still positive
and signicant. Finally, the interaction of the LTV ratio with the current change in income is also
signicant (p-value of 8%) when we use the Lamont and Stein specication. This last specication
makes it easier to assess the implied magnitude of the e¤ect of the LTV ratio on income sensitivities.
The coe¢ cient returned for Log(Income)tLTVt suggests that if the LTV goes from 0:60 to 0:90,
the income-price sensitivity increases from 0:84 to 1:23. These estimates imply, for example, that a
2% drop in per capita GDP will depress housing prices by some 1% more in the UK than in Italy.
  insert Table 4 here  
Table 5 reports the results we obtain after imposing several modications to our basic empirical
models. For brevity, we use the specication with three lags of income and prices (columns (2) and
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(3) of Table 4) as a benchmark.13
  insert Table 5 here  
Our interpretation of the positive correlation between the LTV ratio and the income sensitivity
of housing prices is that this e¤ect is driven by di¤erences in the availability of mortgage nance
to households in di¤erent countries. To provide further evidence that our results are indeed driven
by di¤erences in nancial constraints (as opposed to some trivial simultaneity story), we adopt an
instrumental variables approach. In particular, we instrument the LTV ratio in our model with vari-
ables that we expect are related to the level of nancial development across countries. In countries
with higher nancial development it should be easier for both rms and households to raise outside
nance. In the context of mortgage nance, a higher level of nancial development should arguably
be reected in the availability of higher LTV ratios for households.
Our set of instruments for LTV includes the index of accounting standards computed by the
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. Accounting standards have been used as a
measure of nancial development in Rajan and Zingales (1998), among others. The second variable
included in our instrument set is a proxy for the e¤ectiveness of the countrys judicial system. This
proxy is taken from LaPorta et al. (1998). Arguably, the higher the standards of nancial disclosure
and the more advanced the judicial system in a country, the easier it is for rms to raise funds
from a wider circle of investors. The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show that the e¤ect
of the LTV ratio on income sensitivities actually increases after instrumenting for overall nancial
development.14 This is true both with and without the inclusion of country e¤ects. These results
suggest that our previous ndings are indeed driven by variables a¤ecting the availability of nance.
To the extent that maximum LTVs and economic development might be correlated, one could
argue that the results in Table 4 are not primarily driven by nancial development, but simply by
cross-country di¤erences in economic development. It is likely that the fraction of wealth spent in
housing increases with wealth. Then, it could be the case that richer countries have larger income
sensitivities, even if nancial constraints are never binding. This provides for an unconstrained
explanationfor the observed pattern in sensitivities. Another possible explanation for our results is
that the relation between maximum LTV ratios and income sensitivities is driven by cross-country
di¤erences in homeownership. One could argue, for example, that countries with large rental markets
13Our conclusions are similar when we consider the other specications featured in Table 4.
14 Importantly, the rst-stage regressions show that our set of instruments  which also include lags of the
predetermined regressors in the benchmark specication  and the maximum LTV are strongly positively related.
The R2 of the rst-stage regression is 0:39.
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have lower sensitivities and lower LTV ratios because the rental market helps absorb the e¤ect of
an income shock, or because only the wealthiest households own homes in countries with low LTV
ratios. If this argument explains our results, then the cross-country di¤erences in income sensitivities
we observe should be absorbed by variations in the homeownership ratio.
In columns (3) through (6) we address the relevance of these competing stories by adding time-
varying proxies for economic development (levels of per capita GDP in constant international prices)
and homeownership to our specication.15 In columns (3) and (4) we add the economic develop-
ment proxy together with all of its interactions with lags of income change (lags 0 through 2). In
columns (5) and (6) a similar approach is used to control for homeownership. The results from these
tests suggest that neither economic development nor homeownership is robustly related to income
sensitivities after controlling for the LTV ratio.16 The positive e¤ect of LTV on sensitivities remains
mostly unchanged after controlling for homeownership and economic development. The sum of the
interaction terms of the income changes with the LTV ratio is positive and signicant at better than
5% test level in 3 of the 4 added specications; in the remaining specication (column (4)) the sum
of the interaction terms is still marginally signicant (p-value < 12%).
In column (7) we estimate our baseline model using the GMM estimator for dynamic panel data
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Specically, we implement the one-step Arellano-Bond esti-
mator with each of the base model variables instrumented by two of their own lags (in levels). As is
generally the case, the Arellano-Bond estimator returns coe¢ cients that are smaller than those from
the OLS regression. Yet, the e¤ect of the maximum LTV ratio on income sensitivities is still positive
and statistically signicant (at the 1% level).17
Finally, considering the limitation of our sample size, we provide for a direct check for the concern
that our results could driven by observations from one particular country. We do this check by per-
forming a series of GMM estimations of our baseline model in which we disregard data from one of
the sample countries at each run. The lowest point estimate we obtain for
P2
j=0Log(Income)t j
LTVt equals 0.56, which is returned when we exclude Japan from the sample. That estimate
is statistically signicant at the 3% level. Eliminating any of the other sample countries returns
coe¢ cients that are signicant at better than the 1% level.
15The coe¢ cients returned for these controls are mostly insignicant and are thus omitted from Table 5.
16Results are similar if we use both of these variables and all of their interactions with LTV together in one
specication. The same holds under a more parsimonious approach where we only use the LTV ratio and its
interactions with income change in the specication after expunging economic development and homeownership main
e¤ects from LTVs (i.e., using a residual LTV).
17The Sargan test statistic associated with the Arellano-Bond estimator of Table 5 (2(403)=392.1, p-value=64.2%)
reveals that the null of instrument validity cannot be rejected. Also supporting the adequacy of the estimator is the
high p-value (=83.5%) associated with the test of the null of no second-order autocorrelation in the residuals.
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4.3 Collateral constraints and the income sensitivity of new mortgages
In Section 2 we argue that if households are collateral-constrained, then the income sensitivity of
new mortgage borrowings should also be higher in countries with high LTV ratios (Implication 2).
This happens because the credit multiplier is generated by endogenous changes in collateralized debt
capacity.
In Table 6 we use total annual new mortgages as a fraction of GDP as an alternative dependent
variable for our tests. In the absence of priors about the dynamics of new mortgages, we experi-
ment with a few parsimonious specications. These include (a) only the current lag (lag 0) of income
changes, (b) lags 0 through 2 of income changes, and (c) lags 0 and 1 of income changes plus the start-
of-period ratio of price to per capita income (Pricet 1=Incomet 1), as in Lamont and Stein (1999).
The results from OLS-FE estimations including these sets of regressors are reported in columns (1)
through (6) in Table 6. Looking now at smaller samples, we nd evidence that new mortgages re-
spond more to changes in household income when LTV ratios are higher. The interaction between
income and LTV is positive in all models we experiment with, and statistically signicant at better
than the 6% level in all but one of our specications.
  insert Table 6 here  
It might be useful to illustrate the di¤erences in responses of new mortgages to income shocks
across low and high LTV countries using a structural estimation approach. We do this by estimating
a four-equation, two-lag VAR system that includes the change in log per capita GDP, the change in
log CPI, the change in log interest rates, and the log of new mortgages (orthogonalized in this order).
Noting that a limited set of countries has enough time series data on mortgages for a VAR estimation,
we use Italy to capture the accelerator e¤ect in low LTV countries and the US to illustrate the same
e¤ect in high LTV countries. Accordingly, we graph the impulse-response functions of new mortgages
to one-standard-deviation shocks to GDP for Italy and the US (all variables are standardized).
Comparisons between the two panels in Figure 1 make it clear that the demand for housing -
nancing increases far more strongly in the US than it does in Italy following a similar positive shock
to per capita GDP. Specically, note that a one-standard-deviation GDP shock is around 2.50% for
both countries. In the US, this leads to an increase in the ratio of new mortgages to GDP of 0.50%
after one year, while in Italy this ratio increases by only 0.11%. Evidence from new mortgages,
too, agrees with the accelerator mechanism underlying the dynamics of the relation between income
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shocks and constrained borrowing in housing markets.
  insert Figure 1 here  
4.4 Are households in high LTV countries nancially unconstrained?
One might wonder whether a signicantly large fraction of households in countries with high max-
imum LTV ratios such as the US or the UK are really constrained by the availability of collateral.
After all, down payment requirements that are as low as 5% might imply that only the poorest and
youngest households would be constrained by the size of the down payment. Recall, if households
become collateral-unconstrained, the amplication mechanism associated with the nancial acceler-
ator would die out. At rst sight, this possibility should make it harder for us to nd the results
that we have reported, given that the absence of collateral constraints reduces the extent of housing
price uctuations (Stein, 1995). However, one could argue that maximum LTV ratios are proxying
for other (possibly unobservable) variables that are correlated with the sensitivity of housing prices
to income shocks; variables that are unrelated to the nancial accelerator mechanism.
A direct way to address this concern about our tests is to check whether the ratio of collateral-
constrained households is systematically related to maximum LTV ratios. One empirical proxy for
the ratio of households that are subject to binding collateral constraints is the ratio between the
average and the maximum LTVs. A high ratio means that a greater fraction of mortgages are
close to the maximum allowed. We have data on total outstanding mortgages that can be used to
estimate average LTV ratios.18 If higher maximum LTVs increase the fraction of households that are
unconstrained, then we would expect the ratio of average-to-maximum LTV to be negatively related
to maximum LTVs. As it turns out, we nd that countries with higher maximum LTVs have higher
ratios of average-to-maximum LTVs. The correlation between the ratio of average-to-maximum LTV
and the maximum LTV is 0.29 (p-value<1%). Moreover, a regression of this ratio on maximum LTVs
returns a positive and signicant coe¢ cient for maximum LTVs.
Our second take on the proposed alternative story involves testing the sensitivity of our ndings
to the presence of observations with very high maximum LTV ratios in the sample. Accordingly,
we rank observations according to either overall country or country-decade maximum LTV ratios.19
For each of these two LTV ranking schemes, we then discard from the sample, alternatively, obser-
vations in the top decile, quintile, or quartile of the maximum LTV distribution and then reestimate
18The average LTV ratio is computed as the ratio of mortgage debt outstanding to the value of owner occupied
housing, with the latter equal to the stock of housing times the homeownership ratio times the housing price level.
19 In the rst case, we use the average maximum LTV ratio over our entire 30-year sample to rank the countries.
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our baseline specication (both with or without country e¤ects). This procedure allows us to check
whether our results are driven by those (potentially unconstrained) countries with the highest
maximum LTVs. All such estimations (a total of 12) return a positive signicant relation between
LTV ratios and income sensitivities. These ndings, too, are inconsistent with the hypothesis that
country-years with higher maximum LTVs have more unconstrained households.
4.5 The income constraint
The third prediction of Section 2 help us further characterize the collateral-based nancial accelera-
tor. In particular, it states that if the relation between price-income sensitivities and the maximum
LTV ratio is driven by the collateral constraint, then it should be especially strong in countries where
the income constraint is less likely to bind. As we discussed in Section 3, the ratio of the value of
a typical housing unit to disposable income can be seen as a proxy for the income constraint.20 In
countries where housing is more expensive, it is more likely that the income constraint will bind.
If our hypothesis is correct, the relation between sensitivities and maximum LTV ratios should be
particularly more pronounced in countries with inexpensive housing.
In the nal set of tests of our paper, we rank countries according to the distribution of the housing
price-disposable income ratio and classify as expensive(cheap) those in the top (bottom) third
of this ranking.21 We then run separate regressions for the two subsamples. To demonstrate the
robustness of our ndings, we report outputs from OLS and GMM estimations of our baseline model
with three lags of income and prices as well as the results pertaining to the Lamont and Stein (1999)
specication.
The results from the subsample regressions are reported in Table 7. Consistent with our hy-
pothesis, there is a broad positive association between the LTV ratio and income sensitivities, but
this relation is particularly strong and signicant in countries with relatively cheaper housing. This
pattern holds steady across the di¤erent estimation procedures and empirical specications that we
consider. This last set of results provide further evidence that increases in the maximum LTV ratio
increase the sensitivity of housing prices to income because the nancial accelerator is stronger when
20We note that the appropriateness of our proxy depends on a subtle condition: in countries with high price-income
ratios, the income constraint must be more likely to bind than the collateral constraint. We believe this condition
holds generally. To wit, in a country with expensive housing, households will (on aggregate) also tend to be wealthier,
since they own the countrys housing stock. This suggests that housing price increases tighten income constraints
before they tighten wealth constraints. For example, it is true that an increase in the value of the existing housing
stock raises the required down payment for new buyers; however, it also increases the wealth of would-be movers who
own houses (see Stein, 1995).
21Our main conclusions are insensitive to whether we partition our panel data according to the median income-price
ratio or, alternatively, according to quartiles, quintiles, or deciles. As could be expected, the latter partitions produce
stronger but noisier estimates.
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the LTV is higher and households are collateral-constrained.
  insert Table 7 here  
5 Concluding Remarks
This study explore the features that characterize housing nance contracts and international housing
markets to provide novel evidence supporting the nancial accelerator.In particular, we use inter-
national variation in maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios to identify, within a group of constrained
agents, those with more procyclical borrowing capacity. Since the procyclicality in the borrowing ca-
pacity of constrained agents is the amplication mechanism at the heart of the nancial accelerator,
our empirical strategy allows us to provide a direct test of the endogenous mechanism that underlies
the accelerator. Inspired by the model developed by Stein (1995), we propose three implications of
the nancial accelerator hypothesis for housing price dynamics. Our empirical results are consistent
with these three implications; namely that (a) housing prices are more sensitive to aggregate income
shocks in countries with higher maximum LTV ratios; (b) new mortgage borrowings, too, are more
sensitive to aggregate income shocks in countries with higher LTVs; and (c) the empirical relation
between LTV ratios and income sensitivities is stronger in countries in which the income constraint is
less likely to bind. These results indicate that debt capacity is more strongly procyclical in countries
with high LTV ratios, and that the procyclicality of debt capacity a¤ects housing price dynamics
through a collateral constraint. Our empirical analysis explicitly addresses a number of factors that
could potentially inuence the results we obtain.
Besides being a nice laboratory to study the economic e¤ects of the nancial accelerator, the
housing market is also one of the markets where the economic signicance of such e¤ects is likely
to be high. Previous literature has shown that consumer spending is intimately linked to housing
wealth (see, e.g., Case et al., 2001; and Shiller, 2004), that housing investment plays a major role in
the business cycle (Mishkin, 1978; and Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), and that housing collateral and
house price uctuations play an important role in explaining time series and cross-sectional variations
in asset risk premia (Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2005). This paper shows that the endogenous
e¤ect of the nancial accelerator in housing markets help characterize the mechanism through which
what seem to be small, localized shocks get amplied and transmitted throughout the economy.
18
References
Alti, Aydo¼gan, How Sensitive is Investment to Cash FlowWhen Financing is Frictionless?Journal
of Finance 58, 2003, pp. 707-722.
Arellano, Manuel and Stephen Bond, Some Tests of Specication for Panel Data: Monte Carlo
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,Review of Economic Studies 58(2),
April 1991, pp. 277-297.
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, Does Financial Liberalization Spur
Growth,2005, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Barro, Robert and Jong-Wha Lee, Sources of Economic Growth,Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy 40, June 1994, pp. 1-46.
Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations,American
Economic Review 79, March 1989, pp. 14-31.
Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler, Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy
Transmission,Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(4), Fall 1995, pp. 27-48.
Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler and Stephen Gilchrist, The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to
Quality,Review of Economics and Statistics 48, February 1996, pp. 1-15.
Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler and Stephen Gilchrist, The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative
Business Cycle Framework, in Taylor, John B. and Michael Woodford, eds: Handbook of
macroeconomics. Volume 1C. Handbooks in Economics, vol. 15. Amsterdam, New York and
Oxford: Elsevier Science, North-Holland, 1999, pp. 1341-1393.
Carlstrom, Charles and Timothy Fuerst, Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluctuations: A
Computable General Equilibrium Analysis,American Economic Review 87, December 1997,
pp. 893-910.
Case, Karl E., John M. Quigley and Robert J. Shiller, Comparing Wealth E¤ects: The Stock
Market Versus the Housing Market,NBER Working Paper No. 8606, November 2001.
Chiuri, Maria C. and Tullio Jappelli, Financial Market Imperfections and Homeownership: A
Comparative Study,mimeo, 2000.
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, Finance, and Firm Growth, Journal of
Finance 53, 1998, pp. 2107-2137.
Englund, Peter and Yannis Ioannides, Housing Price Dynamics: An International Empirical Per-
spective,Journal of Housing Economics 6, June 1997, pp. 119-136.
Genesove, David and Christopher Mayer, Equity and Time-To-Sale in the Real Estate Equity
Market,American Economic Review 87, 1997, pp. 255-269.
Gertler, Mark and Stephen Gilchrist, Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and the Behavior of Small
Manufacturing Firms,Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(2), May 1994, pp. 309-40.
Gomes, João, Financing Investment,American Economic Review 91, December 2001, pp. 1263-
1285.
19
Hubbard, R. Glenn, Capital Market Imperfections and Investment. The Journal of Economic
Literature 36, March 1998, pp. 193-227.
Jappelli, Tullio and Marco Pagano, Consumption and Capital Market Imperfections: An Interna-
tional Comparison,American Economic Review 79, December 1989, pp. 1088-1105.
Jappelli, Tullio and Marco Pagano, Savings, Growth and Liquidity Constraints,Quarterly Journal
of Economics 109, February 1994, pp. 83-109.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and John Moore, Credit Cycles, Journal of Political Economy 105, April
1997, pp. 211-48.
Lamont, Owen and Jeremy Stein, Leverage and Housing Price Dynamics in US Cities,RAND
Journal of Economics 30, Autumn 1999, pp. 498-514.
LaPorta, Raphael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Law and Fi-
nance,Journal of Political Economy 106, 1998, pp. 1113-1155.
Levine, Ross, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, Journal of
Economic Literature 35, 1997, pp. 688-726.
Lustig, Hanno and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Housing Collateral, Consumption Insurance and Risk
Premia: an Empirical Perspective,2004, forthcoming, Journal of Finance.
Mishkin, Frederic S., The Household Balance Sheet and the Great Depression,Journal of Eco-
nomic History 38(4), December 1978, pp. 918-937.
Ortalo-Magné, François and Sven Rady, Housing Market Dynamics: On the Contribution of In-
come Shocks and Credit Constraints,2005, Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
Poterba, James M., House Price Dynamics: The Role of Tax Policy and Demography,Brooking
Papers on Economic Activity 4(2), 1991, pp. 143-183.
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth,American Economic
Review 88, June 1998, pp. 559-586.
Shiller, Robert, Household Reaction to Changes in Housing Wealth,2004, mimeo.
Spiegel, Matthew, Housing Return and Construction Cycles,Real Estate Economics 29, Winter
2001, pp. 521-551.
Stein, Jeremy, Prices and Trading Volume in the Housing Market: A Model with Down Payment
E¤ects,Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, May 1995, pp. 379-406.
20
Data Appendix
This appendix describes in detail several of the data items we use in the paper.
Housing price indices
Most of the data for developed countries are supplied by Peter Englund, which are the same data used
in Englund and Ioannides (1997). Below we refer to this source as EI. Their data covers the period
1970-1992. We update their data set using the Annual Reports from the Bank of International Settle-
ments (BIS), which give information on the same indices used by Englund and Ioannides. For coun-
tries not included in the Englund and Ioannides data set, we use other sources described below. We
list all the specic sources for each country, and the information we have about the respective indices.
Australia. EI, and BIS. Weighted average index of prices for all capital cities and other areas;
obtained from quarterly national census of home loan approvals, available annually. Updated using
the AUEHPI index from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Belgium. EI, and BIS. Index based on annual transactions reports on small and medium sized
dwellings from entire country, with outliers excluded, available annually.
Canada. EI, and BIS. Average annual transaction prices reported by multiple listing services for
entire country, covering 70% of all transactions. Updated using the New House Price Index from the
Statistics Canada, available at http://cansim2.statcan.ca.
Chile. Data provided by Felipe Morande, from Morande, F. and R. Soto (1992) updated by R.
Soto. Based on standardized dwellings in the area of Santiago, annual average.
Denmark. EI, and BIS. Average value of single-family homes, including only armslength sales,
available annually.
Finland. EI and BIS. Average price per apartment and terraced houses, obtained per square me-
ter, as recorded by realtors (including 30% of all transactions), weighted by region, available quarterly.
France. EI and BIS. Index based on BISown estimate, based on annual values for the Paris
region, adjusted by four-year survey for entire country.
Germany. EI and BIS. Transaction prices per square meter, obtained from realtors for the four
largest cities, available annually.
Hong Kong. Index constructed by the Rating and Valuation Department, from the Hong Kong
Property Review, data from Chou and Shih (1995), updated using data on the same index available
at http://www.info.gov.hk.
Ireland. EI and BIS. Average transactions price for existing homes, based on all loan approvals,
available annually.
Israel. Property price index representative of the entire country, from the Social Sciences Data
Archive (data used in Bar Nathan et al., 1998), updated using data from the Israel Central Bureau
of Statistics (www.cbs.gov.il/srcer.cgi).
Italy. EI and BIS. Average price for new and completely refurbished dwellings in large and
middle-sized cities and tourist areas, reported by realtors, available annually.
Japan. Urban Residential Land Price Index, from the Japanese Real Estate Institute, available
at www.reinet.or.jp.
Korea. Land Price of Housing, from the Korea Appraisal Board, Appraisal Research & Develop-
ment Center, available at www.kreic.com.
Malaysia. IHRM (Malaysian House Price Index % change from previous year). Data provided by
Steve Malpezzi and used in Malpezzi and Mayo (1997), updated using data from the Countrywides
Sourcebook 2000.
Netherlands. EI and BIS. Weighted average sales price for existing single and multi-family homes,
reported by realtors, including 50-60% of all transactions, available annually.
New Zealand. Data from Dalziel and Lattimore (1999), Valuation New Zealand Housing Price
Series, average prices of free-hold house sales, adjusted for quality, updated using BIS data.
Norway. EI and BIS. Average sales price of existing homes, weighted by type of dwelling, reported
by Property Owners Association, covering about 50% of all transactions.
Singapore. Data from Phang and Wong (1997). Value weighted average of current prices of ve
types of property in ve planning districts. Excludes public housing. Updated using the SIPRIRES
index of the Singapore Department of Statistics.
Spain. Data provided by O. Bover. Prices per square meter of new dwellings in Madrid, used in
Bover (1993). Updated with the Price Index for Existing Dwellings, from Hypostat 1999.
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Sweden. EI and BIS. Index based on owner-occupied one- and two-dwelling buildings, based on
reports of title registrations for arms length transactions, weighted by type of dwelling, available
annually.
Switzerland. Real estate price index for 3-5 bedroom single family homes, from the Swiss National
Bank (http://www.snb.ch/e/search/index.html).
Taiwan. Median of Housing Prices in Taipei, provided by Shiawee Yang.
Thailand. Real housing price index used in Malpezzi and Mayo (1997). Data provided by S.
Malpezzi covering the period from 1970-1986. Updated using the series on Land Price Increases in
Bangkok, from the Agency for Real Estate A¤airs.
UK. EI and BIS. Index based on survey of all dwellings with building societies mortgages, weighted
by type of dwelling, available annually.
US. EI and BIS. Index based on sales price of existing single-family homes, based on realtor
reports, adjusted by regional availability of single-family homes and homeowner mobility, available
annually.
New mortgages
Data for net new mortgage lending for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Netherlands
and Spain is from Hypostat 1989-1999, and data for Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden,
UK and US is from the OECD, also used by Girouard and Blondal (2001), and kindly provided to
us by Nathalie Girouard.
Maximum LTV ratios
Data is from Jappelli and Pagano (1994), updated with data from Chiuri and Jappelli (2000). The
data is given in 10-year averages. We extended this data as follows: for Denmark, Japan, New Zealand
and Norway we assumed the Jappelli and Pagano 1980-1987 data extends to 1990. We took 1991-
1999 data for Denmark and Norway from Maclennan, Muellbauer and Stephens (1998). Singapore
1991-1999 data is from Phang and Wong (1997). The data for Chile, Hong Kong, Korea (1980-1999),
Japan (1991-1999), New Zealand (1991-1999) and Switzerland is from the Countrywides Sourcebook,
1995 and 2000. Malaysia and Thailand 1991-1999 data is from the Asian Development Bank, 1999.
Homeownership ratios
Data for Australia, Belgium, Canada (1970-1989), France (1970-1980), Germany (1970-1980), Italy
(1970-1980), Netherlands (1970-1980), Spain (1970-1980), and Taiwan is from Chiuri and Jappelli
(2000). Data for Chile, Denmark, Finland, France (1981-1999), Germany (1981-1999), Hong Kong,
Ireland, Italy (1981-1999), Japan, Netherlands (1981-1999), Norway, Sweden and Spain (1981-1999)
is from the Countrywides Sourcebook 2000. Data for Korea and Malaysia is from the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, 1999. Data for Canada (1991-1999), New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand,
UK and US is from the Euromonitor (available at www.euromonitor.com).
Price-income ratios
The data on personal disposable income is from the Economic Outlook No 70: Annual and Semi-
annual data (Source: OECD), with the following exceptions: the data for Denmark and Thailand is
from DRI-Wefa (http://www.dri-wefa.com/), the data for Taiwan is taken from the Government sta-
tistics at http://www.stat.gov.tw. We collected the nominal housing price for a particular year, and
then we used the housing price index described above to extrapolate the series for all years. The data
for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden represents the typical
price for a at of 150 square meters in 1999, and is taken from the Countrywides Sourcebook 2000.
The data for Canada (average price of all dwellings, 1995-1999), Ireland (average new house price for
the whole country, 1996-1998), Korea (median price of typical 710 square feet apartment in Seoul in
1990), New Zealand (median price of a home, 1999), UK (Mix-adjusted average house price in 1999),
and the US (average existing single family house price from 1990-1999), are also taken from the Coun-
trywides Sourcebook 2000. Below we list the sources and denitions for the remaining countries:
Australia - typical house price in 1999, from http://www.amp.com.au/au/ampweb.nsf/Content.
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Chile - price of an standardized dwelling in selected areas of Santiago, 1975-1998, from Morande
and Soto (1992).
Germany - price of existing detached houses, 1970-1993, from Muelder and Wagner (1998).
Hong Kong - price of a 100 square meter at, 1982-1992, from Chou and Shih (1995).
Israel - typical apartment price in 1999, from www.jpost.com.
Japan - typical apartment price in 1999, from www.pricechecktokyo.com.
Malaysia- typical price of a single-story detached home in 1998, from www.jpph.gov.my.
Norway - average price of a 150 square meter at, from Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no).
Singapore - 1999, average house price from Asia Week, www.asiaweek.com.
Switzerland - price of an average 4 bedroom semi-detached house with parking in 1999, from
www.expatacess.com.
Taiwan - actual average housing purchase price, 1981-1989, from Lin (1993).
Thailand - 1994-97 average house price, from the Asian Development Bank.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Housing Price Changes, Income Growth, and
New Mortgages
This table displays summary statistics for housing prices chages, income growth, and new
mortgages for 26 countries over the 1970-1999 period. ∆Log(Price) is the log change in
the real housing price index. ∆Log(Income) is the log change in real per capita GDP. New
mortgages are net new lending against mortgage in residential property divided by nominal
GDP. GDP, population, and inflation data are from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics. The housing price and new mortgage data are described in the Appendix.
Mean Std. Dev. Pct 5 Pct 25 Median Pct 75 Pct 95 N. Obs
∆Log(Price) 0.020 0.116 −0.150 −0.034 0.015 0.072 0.210 718
∆Log(Income) 0.030 0.045 −0.033 0.007 0.027 0.051 0.102 754
New Mortgages 0.030 0.022 0.002 0.015 0.027 0.040 0.069 278
Table 2: Average Maximum Loan-to-Value (LTV), Homeownership, and
Price-Income Ratios by Country-Decade, 1970-1999
Maximum LTV ratios represent the highest mortgage loan that households can get
from lenders as a fraction of the value of the property owned. The homeownership
ratio is the proportion of homeowners as a fraction of total households. The price-
income ratio is the nominal price of a typical home divided by personal disposable
income per capita. All data items are described in the Appendix.
Country LTV Ratio Homeown. Ratio Price-Income Ratio
70’s 80’s 90’s 70’s 80’s 90’s 70’s 80’s 90’s
Australia 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.70 0.70 0.70 10.5 8.5 9.5
Belgium 0.65 0.75 0.80 0.66 0.66 0.66 9.4 7.5 8.4
Canada 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.63 0.63 0.64 8.9 7.8 8.6
Chile N/A N/A 0.78 N/A 0.63 N/A N/A 9.0 13.0
Denmark 0.85 0.95 0.80 N/A 0.55 0.52 N/A 8.8 7.6
Finland 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.61 0.65 0.62 16.4 15.3 10.1
France 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.57 0.53 0.54 8.9 8.4 9.8
Germany 0.65 0.65 0.80 0.43 0.43 0.41 22.3 18.0 15.7
Hong Kong N/A 0.90 0.70 0.18 0.33 0.47 N/A 21.8 34.0
Ireland 0.80 0.90 0.80 N/A 0.77 0.79 9.6 9.0 9.1
Israel 0.50 0.70 N/A 0.70 N/A 0.80 N/A 19.0 25.1
Italy 0.50 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.73 17.2 14.4 10.7
Japan N/A 0.60 0.55 0.60 0.62 0.60 22.2 22.1 20.4
Korea 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.59 0.52 0.52 41.6 42.4 32.3
Malaysia 0.65 N/A 0.85 N/A N/A 0.67 N/A 21.9 24.2
Netherlands 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.48 0.46 0.51 12.2 9.5 11.0
New Zealand 0.66 0.80 0.80 N/A 0.71 0.73 7.4 7.0 8.8
Norway 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.74 0.78 0.76 13.8 13.6 9.6
Singapore N/A N/A 0.85 N/A 0.90 0.88 N/A 32.4 43.2
Spain 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.74 0.73 0.78 10.3 10.6 13.2
Sweden 0.90 0.95 0.75 0.50 0.54 0.60 15.1 11.2 9.6
Switzerland N/A N/A 0.90 0.30 0.31 N/A N/A 36.5 27.1
Taiwan 0.40 N/A N/A 0.77 0.78 0.84 7.2 7.6 4.5
Thailand 0.65 N/A 0.75 0.89 0.86 0.82 17.4 16.5 29.4
UK 0.81 0.87 0.95 0.56 0.61 0.67 10.4 10.6 8.6
US 0.80 0.89 0.80 0.66 0.64 0.65 7.4 7.3 6.9
Table 3: Housing Price Dynamics
The dependent variable is ∆Log(Price), the log change in the real housing price index. ∆Log(Income) is the log change in
real per capita GDP. Pricet−1/Incomet−1 is the start-of-period ratio of the real housing price index to real per capita GDP.
Real interest rate is the nominal long-term interest rate on a government bond (usually 10-year benchmark government bond
yield), from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics or from the OECD’s Economic Outlook, minus the inflation rate in
the same year. Inflation rate is the change in the consumer price index for the current year, taken from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics. The estimation period is 1970-1999. The estimations correct the error structure for heterosckedasticity
using the White-Hubber estimator. t-stats (in parentheses).
Indep. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆Log(Income)t 1.187 0.942 0.942 1.125 1.061 1.009 1.022
(9.07)*** (6.61)*** (6.36)*** (7.17)*** (6.94)*** (7.13)*** (7.49)***
∆Log(Income)t−1 0.510 0.409 0.555 0.214 0.356
(3.38)*** (2.52)*** (3.47)*** (1.44) (2.40)**
∆Log(Income)t−2 0.248 0.083 0.342 0.171 0.176
(2.23)** (0.58) (2.15)** (1.13) (1.17)
∆Log(Price)t−1 0.241 0.193 0.347 0.278 0.348
(3.33)*** (2.61)*** (4.84)*** (3.76)*** (5.34)***
∆Log(Price)t−2 −0.099 −0.111 −0.169 0.045
(−1.62) (−1.80)* (−2.46)*** (0.85)
Interest Rate −0.289
(−2.41)**
Inflation Rate −0.109
(−1.06)
Pricet−1/Incomet−1 −0.253 −0.246
(−7.67)*** (−7.50)***
S2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j 1.700 1.434 2.022 1.446 1.541
Summation Test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Exclusion Test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Country Effects? No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 718 679 666 666 616 666 692
Adj-R2 0.226 0.265 0.310 0.317 0.381 0.408 0.378
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 4: House Prices and the Multiplier Effect: Baseline Regressions
The dependent variable is∆Log(Price), the log change in the real housing price index.
∆Log(Income) is the log change in real per capita GDP. Pricet−1/Incomet−1 is the
start-of-period ratio of the real housing price index to real per capita GDP. Real
interest rate is the nominal long-term interest rate on a government bond (usually
10-year benchmark government bond yield), from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics or from the OECD’s Economic Outlook, minus the inflation rate in the same
year. Inflation rate is the change in the consumer price index for the current year,
taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. LTVt is the maximum LTV
ratio for year t. The estimation period is 1970-1999. The estimations correct the
error structure for heterosckedasticity using the White-Hubber estimator. t-stats (in
parentheses).
Indep. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Log(Income)t −0.437 −0.787 −0.622 −0.273 0.051
(−0.96) (−1.31) (−1.00) (−0.42) (0.10)
∆Log(Income)t−1 1.174 1.029 0.132
(1.11) (1.03) (0.17)
∆Log(Income)t−2 −0.470 −0.199 0.504
(−0.62) (−0.24) (0.91)
∆Log(Price)t−1 0.228 0.174 0.299 0.332
(3.01)*** (2.08)** (4.21)*** (4.88)***
∆Log(Price)t−2 −0.070 −0.081 −0.089
(−1.35) (−1.47) (−1.71)*
Interest Rate −0.287
(−1.39)
Inflation Rate −0.092
(−0.69)
Pricet−1/Incomet−1 −0.231
(−8.71)***
LTVt −0.065 −0.037 −0.214 0.007 −0.068
(−1.52) (−0.81) (−2.40)** (0.16) (−0.82)
∆Log(Income)t × LTVt 2.276 1.315
(3.58)*** (1.80)*
S2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j 2.152 2.414 1.420
×LTVt (2.45)*** (1.95)** (1.75)*
Country Effects? No No Yes No Yes
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 611 567 567 531 589
Adj-R2 0.220 0.297 0.316 0.342 0.362
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 5: House Prices and the Multiplier Effect: Alternative Specifications
The dependent variable in columns (1) through (7) is ∆Log(Price), the log change in real housing price index. ∆Log(Income) is the
log change in real per capita GDP. Pricet−1/Incomet−1 is the start-of-period ratio of the real housing price index to real per capita
GDP. In columns (1) and (2) we instrument LTVt with proxies for the quality of accounting standards and judicial efficiency. Judicial
efficiency is an assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, compiled by the Business
International Corporation, taken from LaPorta et al. (1998). Acounting standards is the index of accounting standards computed by
the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research, data from LaPorta et al. (1998). In columns (3) and (4) we control for
the level of economic development (PPP-ajusted per capita GDP) by including the intercept variable as well as its interactions with
each of the lags of ∆Log(Income) (coefficients omitted). Likewise, in columns (5) and (6) we add intercept and interaction terms
for homeownership and ∆Log(Income). The data for per capita GDP in constant prices is from Penn World Tables, taken from the
Barro and Lee (1994) dataset, and augmented with data from the Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators. The
homeownership ratio is the proportion of homeowners as a fraction of total households. In column (7) we use the GMM estimator for
dynamic panel data proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The estimation period is 1970-1999. The OLS estimations correct the
error structure for heterosckedasticity using the White-Hubber estimator. t-stats (in parentheses).
IV Added Controls for Added Controls for GMM
Fin. Develop. Econ. Develop. Homeownership
Indep. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆Log(Income)t −2.940 −2.717 −0.671 −0.512 −0.971 −0.900 −0.471
(−2.51)** (−2.36)** (−1.17) (−0.85) (−0.88) (−0.79) (−0.94)
∆Log(Income)t−1 1.802 1.884 1.194 1.054 1.044 0.828 1.968
(1.04) (1.13) (1.13) (1.07) (0.86) (0.68) (2.75)***
∆Log(Income)t−2 −1.583 −1.357 −0.411 −0.187 −0.113 0.001 −1.766
(−1.35) (−1.09) (−0.53) (−0.23) (−0.13) (0.01) (−3.73)***
∆Log(Price)t−1 0.227 0.188 0.230 0.184 0.233 0.164 1.051
(2.86)*** (2.14)** (3.05)*** (2.21)** (2.90)*** (1.77)* (23.80)***
∆Log(Price)t−2 −0.088 −0.099 −0.076 −0.091 −0.049 −0.068 −0.315
(−1.64) (−1.49) (−1.45) (−1.64) (−0.83) (−1.08) (−7.45)***
LTVt −0.077 −0.079 −0.056 −0.175 −0.038 −0.217 −0.025
(−0.97) (−1.01) (−1.17) (−2.10)** (−0.79) (−2.40)** (−2.23)**
S2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j 6.078 5.924 2.085 2.275 2.048 3.214 0.754
×LTVt (3.66)*** (2.83)*** (2.04)** (1.56) (2.15)** (2.60)*** (3.37)***
Country Effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 540 540 567 567 510 510 567
Adj-R2 0.313 0.322 0.307 0.323 0.289 0.316 52.05(a)
Table Notes: (a) F -statistic. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 6: The Multiplier Effect in New Mortgages
The dependent variable in columns (1) through (6), New Mortgages, is the net new lending against mortgage in residential
property divided by GDP. ∆Log(Income) is the log change in real per capita GDP. Pricet−1/Incomet−1 is the start-of-period
ratio of the real housing price index to real per capita GDP. LTV is the maximum loan-to-value ratio. The estimation period
is 1970-1999. The OLS estimations correct the error structure for heterosckedasticity using the White-Hubber estimator.
t-stats (in parentheses).
Indep. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log(Income)t —0.572* —0.540* —0.632* —0.584* —0.588 —0.834**
(—1.72) (—1.67) (—1.82) (—1.75) (—1.59) (—2.22)
∆Log(Income)t−1 0.266 0.195 0.137* 0.130*
(0.86) (0.82) (1.82) (1.89)
∆Log(Income)t−2 —0.219 —0.176
(—0.64) (—0.63)
Pricet−1/Incomet−1 0.027*** 0.039***
(4.53) (3.83)
LTVt 0.054** 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.042*** 0.040***
(4.40) (2.82) (3.88) (2.62) (3.15) (2.69)
∆Log(Income)t × LTVt 0.997** 0.933** 1.049*** 1.020***
(2.28) (2.08) (2.85) (2.57)
S2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j 0.947* 0.765
×LTVt (1.85) (1.48)
Country Effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 271 271 265 265 268 268
Adj-R2 0.206 0.509 0.231 0.512 0.287 0.560
Table Notes: ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 7: The Income Constraint Effect
For each country, we use the average price-income ratio for the period 1970-1999 (subject to data availability) to classify
countries in the “cheap” and “expensive” categories. The price-income ratio is the nominal price of a typical home
divided by personal disposable income percapita. Cheap (expensive) housing countries are those ranked in the bottom
(top) third of the cross-country distribution of the ratio of house prices to per capita GDP. The countries in the cheap
housing category are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Tawain, and the US.
The expensive housing countries are: Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Switzerland, and Thailand.
The estimation period is 1970-1999. The baseline-OLS specification is the one in column (3) of Table 4, including three
lags of income and housing price changes, as well as the interactions of the LTV ratio with the income changes. The
baseline-GMM specification uses the GMM estimator for dynamic panel data proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
as in column (7) of Table 4. The Lamont and Stein specification is the one in column (5) of Table 4, which includes
the current change in per capita GDP and its interaction with the LTV ratio. The OLS estimations correct the error
structure for heterosckedasticity using the White-Hubber estimator. t-stats (in parentheses).
Baseline—OLS Baseline—GMM Lamont-SteinS2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j × LTVt
S2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j × LTVt ∆Log(Income)t × LTVt
Cheap Housing Countries 8.497 2.808 9.742
(1.64)* (2.59)*** (3.92)***
Expensive Housing Countries 2.508 0.227 1.001
(1.38) (0.45) (0.93)
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Figure 1: Impulse—Response Functions
This figure shows the response of new mortgages to a one-standard-deviation shock
to per capita GDP. The estimates come from a two-lag VAR system that also
includes changes in log CPI and interest rates (all variables are standardized).
Panel A plots results for data from Italy and Panel B uses US data. The system
is estimated with yearly series from 1975 through 1999.
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